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1 . 1  A b s t r a c t  7 
This article explores the uneven patterns of topographic mapping of colonial Northern 8 
Rhodesia (today Zambia). These patterns were generated in the years 1927-1931 and have an 9 
enduring effect today. Previous accounts describe colonial mapping in Africa as ‘incomplete’, 10 
but this is an inadequate conclusion. The article proposes that these unsatisfactory narratives of 11 
cartography can be corrected by applying the model of a cartographic economy to the close 12 
reading of archival sources. This model is used to interrogate topographic unevenness within 13 
the framework of the interests of diverse parties, with differing values and resources. It reveals 14 
that the patterns of topographic production were particularly strongly linked to aerial 15 
photographic projects. These projects documented areas that were preconceived as valuable. 16 
However the article reveals that the cartographic economy was determined by more than just 17 
the value of the land, as the value of the cartographic representation itself could be 18 
manipulated independently. This perspective should be considered in the study of British 19 
mapping of other colonial territories. 20 
1 . 2  I n t r o d u c t i o n  21 
The question this paper addresses is encapsulated in Figure 1, a representation of the radically 22 
uneven production of topographic mapping at 1:250,000 in the British African colony of 23 
Northern Rhodesia (today’s Zambia).1 This schema shows that parts of the territory were 24 
                                                        
1 Northern Rhodesia was under British crown rule between 1924 and 1964. However from 1953 onwards 
the colony was part of a conglomerated territory, the Federation of Rhodesias and Nyasaland.     
Responsibility for topographic production was transferred to the Federation in 1955, and was 
organized under federal authority until Zambian independence in 1964. Figure 1 only depicts the 
topographic maps produced by the Northern Rhodesian Survey Department, thus before 1955.  
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mapped at very different densities of detail. For certain areas topography was drawn up from 25 
aerial photography; for others it was drawn up with much sparser information from land-based 26 
survey. Up until 1955, a significant proportion of the colony saw no mapping at that scale at all. 27 
1:250,000 was considered to the minimum necessary scale for governance, yet mapping at 28 
1:500,000 (a scale at which entire Benelux region could be represented on a single sheet) was 29 
the most detailed published mapping available to many local administrators during colonial 30 
rule, particularly in the West of the colony.2 The unevenness generated at that time has 31 
remained the status quo.3 Patterns of knowledge, and absence of knowledge, persisted largely 32 
intact in the print publication of maps throughout the twentieth century, and continue to be 33 
reflected in the geo-coding of satellite data. Anecdotally, this situation is familiar, but it has not 34 
been adequately addressed by literature on the role of cartography in twentieth-century state 35 
formation and governance. This article proposes a new mode of analysis to explore this 36 
cartographic heterogeneity. It proposes that the necessity (even the relative usefulness) of 37 
topography to the colonial state cannot be taken for granted. We return to the archives to ask 38 
under what circumstances topographic maps were considered to be worth producing, and 39 
whose interests determined that ‘worth’. 40 
                                                        
2 Mapping was produced for some areas at a larger scale, this was only occasional until the 1950s.  
3 From 1946 mapping of certain areas of Northern Rhodesia was at 1:50,000 produced by a further 
agency, the Directorate of Colonial Surveys (DCS). The work of the DCS is not discussed here, but 
conformed to the pattern of unevenness for more than another decade, during which time it was 
tightly tied to high capital development projects (Macdonald, 1996).  
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 41 
Figure 1: Distribution of map sheets at 1:250,000 compiled by the Survey Department of Northern Rhodesia, 42 
1928-1955 (Pullan, 1978) 43 
This position breaks strongly from prevailing conceptualisations of state topography. Amongst 44 
the variety of forms that state visualisations can take, topography has a privileged status since it 45 
forms the ‘base map’ or geographical index for a much broader range governmental projects: 46 
whether the organisation of cadastral records; the notation of vegetable, mineral, animal, and 47 
water resources; or the analysis of demographic data (Monmonier, 1985). The very notion of the 48 
base map suggests the unification of multiple cartographic functions into a single cartographic 49 
system, “an epistemological singularity that required that at any one time there should be only 50 
one map of one territory” (Edney, 2011, page 78). Scholarship since the 1990s has made it a 51 
commonplace that the topographic or base map is not ‘neutral’ or experienced as such 52 
(Blomley, 2003; Harley, 1989; Wood and Fels, 1992)). Nonetheless, topography is generally 53 
considered to have uniform characteristics and function within a single ‘state-space’. This 54 
perspective prevails to the point that the homogenisation of heterogeneous sites and spaces 55 
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through topographic mapping has come to be seen as a necessary condition for the genealogy 56 
of the ‘state-space’ or ‘territory’ (Biggs, 1999; Branch, 2014; Elden, 2013).4  57 
Assumptions about the uniformity and ubiquity of state cartography underpin a wide variety of 58 
literatures. General treatments of state cartography tend to accentuate the ways in which 59 
governmental power is increased through the centralised accumulation of territorial 60 
visualisations, and state-determined ontologies of natural resources (Crampton, 2011; Demeritt, 61 
2001; Scott, 1998; Whitehead et al., 2007). Marxist spatial theory brings a vocabulary that is 62 
highly-attuned to various forms of unevenness (Harvey, 1982, 2006; Lefebvre, 2009), and might 63 
have assisted our understanding of this topography as related to the production of “a 64 
differentiated and integrated space economy” (Harvey, 1982, page 375). But this scholarship 65 
offers us surprisingly little purchase on differences in the deployment of cartographic 66 
visualization.5 The principle of uniform topographic coverage is also taken up by technical 67 
histories of African cartography: which therefore explain unevenness as failure on the part of 68 
British colonial regimes due to insufficient governmental resources (McGrath, 1976; Stone, 69 
1995).  This explanation clearly falls into the mode outlined by James Ferguson, in which 70 
political intent is obscured by narratives of technical inadequacy (1990).  The positive choices – 71 
which areas were mapped – remain naturalised or unaccounted for. It is this challenge, to 72 
account for the positive choices, that forces a new approach.   73 
To address that challenge this article proposes the model of a ‘cartographic economy’. This 74 
work follows the lead of scholars who have cautioned against treating imperial or colonial 75 
agencies as monolithic, and demonstrated them to be distributed networks of groups, 76 
                                                        
4 There has been debate over whether colonial mapping practices allowed for, or stemmed from, those 
of European states but a resultant homogenisation of space is assumed to be similar for both colonised 
and colonising countries (Branch, 2012; Escolar, 1997). 
5 The emphasis on the homogenizing quality of mapping has obscured the variety of relationships that 
modern state-mapping might have to forms of economic activity, the mobilities of capital and of 
labour. A uniform one is assumed. Genealogically, cartography is seen as the basis for both “the 
commodification of space and the production of new but equally oppressive geographical systems for 
the containerization of power”(Harvey, 1989, page 258) (my emphasis). The state is considered the 
progenitor of the ‘space’ of the space-economy. 
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individuals and influences.6 In particular it borrows from an expanding body of work on the 77 
representational economies of governance (Agrawal, 2005; Ghertner, 2010; Hull, 2012).7 78 
Participants in the early twentieth-century Northern Rhodesian cartographic economy 79 
included the imperial mapping authorities, as well as the Northern Rhodesian ones; the 80 
Northern Rhodesian secretariat; colonial scientific officers; the mining (and other) companies 81 
who invested in the Copperbelt during that period; and an early aerial photographic business. 82 
For each of these groups topography represented the means to a different end, they had 83 
differing resources, and variable leverage.  84 
In exploring the history of the ‘value’ of Northern Rhodesian topography, the article focuses, in 85 
particular, on aerial photography as a cartographic technology. Critical literature is beginning to 86 
address the variety of civil uses of early twentieth century aerial photography (Cronin, 2007; 87 
Dyce, 2013; Haffner, 2013; Monmonier, 2002), we are focusing here on its use for mapping for 88 
two reasons. Firstly, because as seen by comparing Figure 1 and Figure 2, the production of 89 
topography was tightly linked to the deployment of aerial photography. Four aerial 90 
photographic projects that were carried out in quick succession between 1927-1931 became the 91 
basis of three-quarters of the mapping at 1:250,000 produced by the Northern Rhodesian 92 
government for the subsequent twenty-four years (Blocks A-D in Figure 1). Secondly, aerial 93 
photography was more capital-intensive than traditional land-based surveying methods and as 94 
a result it allows us to see the workings of the cartographic ‘economy’ in more vivid relief.  95 
                                                        
6 This is a large body of work, but expansions of this in relation to colonial knowledge production 
include (Anderson , 2009; Stoler 2010; Tilley 2011). 
7 Elsewhere, I have used that literature more closely in examining the intersection between Northern 
Rhodesian cartography and the spatiality of indirect rule (Author, forthcoming). Here, by contrast, I 
focus on the value of the topography in directly financial terms. It should be noted that the ‘successful’ 
production of topography is less socially complex than the ‘successful’ production of cadastral 
cartography and that as such indigenous resistance has much weaker influence on outcome (Braun, 
2005; Craib, 2004). 
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 96 
Figure 2: Aerial photography carried out in Northern Rhodesia 1927-1931, against topographic mapping at 97 
1:250,000, 1928-1955 (Pullan 1976; Pullan 1978) 98 
Here we will explore the Northern Rhodesian cartographic economy from three different 99 
perspectives. The first section sets out contrasting positions; the role of cartography in a 100 
planned ‘spatial order’ versus its role in the responsive, tactical management of colonial assets. 101 
The latter scenario better describes the Northern Rhodesian government’s territorial (dis)order, 102 
as the foundation for a cartographic economy subject to diverse influences. The second section 103 
returns to the focus of previous scholarship on the territorial visualization of Northern 104 
Rhodesia - the period 1927-1931 - and the arrival of aerial photography into the colony. This is 105 
revealed to have provided an impetus for topographic production, but only transiently. The 106 
final section uses the deployment of aerial photography to measure the comparative influence 107 
of different parties on the production of a conceptual framework for organizing colonial 108 
resources. All three sections reveal a relationship between the perceived value of topography 109 
and the anticipated value of territory that was both dynamic and reciprocal. 110 
1 . 3  T h e  c a r t o g r a p h i c  e c o n o m y  a n d  c o l o n i a l  ‘ s p a t i a l  o r d e r s ’  111 
In histories that consider the raison d’etre of colonial cartography, the dominant tendency is to 112 
see it as a mechanism for overturning pre-colonial spatial practices and establishing a new 113 
spatial order. This can be seen strongly, for example, in Matthew Edney’s account of the East India 114 
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Company’s Survey of India (1999); Timothy Mitchell’s depiction of cartography in nineteenth-115 
century colonial Egypt (2002); in the dislocation of colonial cartographic principles into Siam as 116 
described by Thongchai Winichakul (1994); and more recently Raymond Craib’s investigation 117 
of modern cartography in Mexico (2004). Whilst technical studies of cartography tend draw out 118 
the differences between varieties of maps and mapmakers, contextual studies of late 119 
nineteenth- and early twentieth- century colonial cartography tend to frame all government 120 
mapping activity within the context of singular, unified outcome: the consolidation of 121 
centralised, distanciated power. So although, for example, in Cartographic Mexico Raymond 122 
Craib elaborates a diversity of mapping projects, emphasis is placed on the ways in which 123 
successive regimes intended to break with the one before, and produce diachronic spatialities or 124 
‘fixations’ (2004).  This tendency has been somewhat compounded by the success of the 125 
literature on mapping in South-East Asia where this characterisation of the relationship 126 
between cartography and centralised power is particularly apt. Studies of colonial rule in this 127 
region have given us evidence of how cartographic practices served the centralised organisation 128 
of forestry (Agrawal, 2005; Barton, 2001), the implementation of a cadaster (Edney, 1999; 129 
Michael, 2007), and the creation of a cartographic icon that cohered ‘an’ Indian identity 130 
(Anderson, 1983; Ramaswamy, 2001).  131 
Although this literature offers many insights, it is difficult to apply the principles of ‘spatial 132 
ordering’ to Northern Rhodesia. In comparison to other imperial territories, there was little 133 
military action against the colonised and the conflicts on its borders during the First World 134 
War were not cartographically productive for the colony.8 ‘Spatial ordering’ would therefore 135 
need to come from civilian visions for the future of the colony and its resources, but these were 136 
not tightly defined. The first years of colonial governance (1890-1924), took place under the 137 
British South Africa Company who had inconsistent policies regarding the desirability of white 138 
settlement (Slinn, 1971). Under Crown rule, from 1924, there was still hesitation about what best 139 
‘to do’ with Northern Rhodesia. Initiatives encouraging settler plantations and farming were 140 
not fully embraced (Gann, 1964). Further dramatic shifts in governmental policy followed the 141 
                                                        
8 This observation can only be made from the absence of map production by British military forces in 
Central Africa as recorded in the catalogued output of the War Office. There has been minimal 
treatment of this region in secondary literature on war cartography (Chasseaud, 2013). 
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sequential discovery and exploitation of different natural resources in the colony, namely teak 142 
timber, from around 1911, and then copper from the 1920s. The taxation of Africans on a per 143 
capita/per household basis was aligned to the organisation of the population as a labour reserve 144 
(Meebelo, 1986), but the economic organisation of Africans was not pursued with the rigour 145 
demonstrated in Southern Rhodesia or South Africa; an attempt at the geographical 146 
segregation of Africans into ‘native’ areas  was enforced only half-heartedly (Gann, 1964; Wills, 147 
1985). 148 
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 149 
Figure 3: The map of field work carried out in 1926 by the Survey Department of Northern Rhodesia. Areas of 150 
field work marked in red (here darker grey), accounted for some boundary demarcation (e.g. 6K), some road 151 
measurement (e.g. 8G) and the cadastral survey of farms such as at (7H). (Annual Report, Survey Department 152 
of Northern Rhodesia, 1927. National Archives UK CO799/3). 153 
 154 
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Within this staccato-ed set of policies, governmental cartographic expertise was also fractured. 155 
Three major kinds of mapping were undertaken. Geodetic survey and international boundary 156 
work were carried out on an exceptional basis by visiting Imperial parties that were funded by 157 
London government. By the late 1920s, these parties had produced thin stretches of mapping 158 
around the borders of the territory, and a strip of geodetic mapping that followed the 30th 159 
Meridian from Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) to Lake Tanganyika (Donaldson, 2008; 160 
Smith, 2006; Stone, 1995). The less highly technical work of ‘routine mapping’ was considered to 161 
be the financial responsibility of individual colonies, and therefore of the local Survey 162 
Departments (McGrath, 1976; Stone, 1995). The majority of the Northern Rhodesian Survey 163 
Department’s time was spent on the cadastral survey of European property, which represented 164 
a very small proportion of the total area of the territory.9 Topographic survey was carried out 165 
on an occasional basis during the tours surveyors made to mark out property, and on an semi-166 
enthusiast basis by local administrators (Pullan, 1978; Stone, 1982). The earliest results of this 167 
work were published between 1917 and 1926 as a provisional 1:250,000 series that putatively 168 
covered the whole colony (Pullan, 1978). However, the majority of the data recorded on these 169 
sheets was unmeasured, much of it was estimated (rivers represented by dotted lines) and huge 170 
expanses were left blank. This can be understood when looking at the annual activity of the 171 
Northern Rhodesian Survey Department. Figure 3 shows the work-done in 1927 (the year of the 172 
first aerial survey). The department employed nine surveyors. The cartographic coverage that 173 
the department achieved that year is represented not by grids or squares but by scattered 174 
scrawls of thin inked in-lines, which give some idea of the pace of accumulation of topographic 175 
data. Although the expansion of the copper industry in the 1920s and 1930s altered these 176 
patterns slightly (the rate of European settlement fluctuated but generally increased), the 177 
nature of the mapping by the Northern Rhodesian Survey Department remained largely the 178 
same up to 1955.  179 
This slow rate of accumulation led to frustration in some parts. In 1936, when Brigadier 180 
Winterbotham, Director General of the British Ordnance Survey, addressed the British 181 
Association for the Advancement of Science, he went so far as to suggest that his audience was 182 
                                                        
9 The measures for the alienation of land are not straightforward, because they didn’t include land 
held under concession but only that which was transmuted into private property. By 1955 this still 
represented a small fraction of the colony, about 7%. See the annual reports of the Survey Department 
(National Archives UK CO/799) (hereafter NA UK). 
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witnessing a “cycle of indifference [to mapping]”, (1936, page 102). We are not used to accounting 183 
for governmental ‘indifference’ to modern cartography. How should we do so? Retrospectively, 184 
Jeffrey Stone has suggested that British apathy towards colonial mapping in this period 185 
stemmed from confidence in the long-term nature of colonial rule (1995, page 107). This offers 186 
us part of an explanation (a temporal framework for defining cartographic value) but not the 187 
whole. In 1936, Brigadier Winterbotham reached the conclusion that, despite global financial 188 
depression, the imperial government considered itself, “rich enough to survive the handicap of 189 
inadequate mapping” (Winterbotham, 1936, page 102). Whilst his claim was deliberately 190 
provocative, it seems to be closer to the mark.  191 
The contextual studies of colonial cartography that speak to ‘spatial ordering’ tend to frame its 192 
economic potential within the aims of a Foucauldian governmentalist state (Crampton and 193 
Elden, 2008). Thus for example, Craib argues that in Mexico in the late 1880s, the government 194 
used cartography to frame the country as a coherent, stable site for investment (2004). For 195 
Mitchell the mapping of Egypt served to render a fiscal landscape more efficiently in the effort 196 
to counter intransigent national debt (Mitchell, 2002). The intensity of cartographic activity 197 
between the years 1927-1931 that we will examine here seems to speak to a ‘gestural 198 
governmentality’ that would blossom into more substantial bureaucratic territorial 199 
management (Hannah, 2000, page 37). However, this is not supported by the longer-term view 200 
of topographic production. On the contrary, when considering the topographic production over 201 
a longer period up to 1955 (Figure 1), it seems that earlier economic attitudes to imperial 202 
territories in tropical Africa prevail, in which it was anticipated that the influx of private capital 203 
would organically produce profit from the innate natural wealth of the continent (Ehrlich, 1973; 204 
Frankel, 1938; Tilley, 2011). I would argue that whilst the patterns of Northern Rhodesian 205 
topography could be seen to reflect political miscalculation or hesitance, they are better 206 
understood as resulting from a temporary injection of capital into mapping, within the 207 
framework of British imperial government in the late 1920s and early 1930s that had an 208 
extremely laissez-faire attitude to resource management.10  209 
                                                        
10 The Northern Rhodesian government didn’t do a great deal facilitate or regulate independent 
economic actors. This can be seen mostly clearly in the fact that the colony did not instate a geological 
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In sum, I propose that the isolated blocks of mapping in Figure 1 do not represent a monolithic, 210 
homogeneous spatial order, or the absence of a spatial order, but rather a spatial interest that 211 
was tactical. Above all, these topographic maps did not anticipate economic activity but were 212 
produced in the wake of relatively unregulated commercial activity, post hoc. From this 213 
perspective, the analytical benefit of the ‘cartographic economy’ becomes clearer. To 214 
understand the role of these maps in the history of the colony we need to address the 215 
contingencies and specificities of their creation, and the diversity of forces in play. The 216 
following sections examine the histories of two sections of topography – Block A and Block D 217 
(Figure 1) – and interrogate the conditions of their ‘tactical’ emergence more closely.  218 
1 . 4  T i m i n g ,  r i s k  a n d  t h e  c a r t o g r a p h i c  e c o n o m y  219 
From the mid-1920s, Northern Rhodesia aroused the interest of international mining 220 
corporations. This heralded a great deal of cartographic activity, including the first uses of 221 
aerial photography. The mapping was born of three interconnected motives. Firstly, the 222 
potential value of deposits required property and concession boundaries to be demarcated at a 223 
greater level of precision, thus activating the value of cartographic records: “A country with a 224 
valuable mining industry cannot afford to be careless of inches” (Worthington, 1938, page 30). 225 
Second was the mapping that facilitated the expansion of related infrastructure, such as roads, 226 
townships and hydroelectric schemes. Thirdly, and most importantly, was the mapping related 227 
to the discovery of minerals. The nature of the copper deposits in Northern Rhodesia (large, but 228 
quite far below the surface, and of quite a low grade) necessitated the identification of wider 229 
geological patterns (Bradley, 1952). Thus systematic prospecting and mapping was carried out 230 
across vast stretches of territory, to trace underlying strata.  231 
The techniques used to visualise Copperbelt ore have recently been investigated by Tomas 232 
Frederiksen (2013). Frederiksen identifies the new intensive and systematic forms of 233 
documentation involved in making the copper deposits ‘legible’ to the headquarters of the 234 
mining companies in London. This documentation (which bypassed government and went 235 
straight to the boardrooms) allowed mining engineer-financiers to decide how to locate 236 
                                                                                                                                                                                                  
department until 1950 despite the fact that the value of Northern Rhodesia’s mineral exports increased 
from £52,000 p.a. to nearly £4.5 million p.a. between 1913 and 1935 (Frankel, 1938, page 212).  
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boreholes, and where to begin exploitation. However, Frederiksen implies that expenditure on 237 
knowledge production (which according to retrospective assessments reached £471,181 between 238 
1926 to 1934), can be taken for granted (Bancroft and Guernsey, 1961, page 90).11 I propose that 239 
these decisions to invest in territorial visualisation need more careful consideration.  240 
In amongst the mining companies’ cartographic expenditure detailed above were the costs 241 
incurred by Rhodesia Congo Border Concession Ltd. (RCBC) on hiring the Aircraft Operating 242 
Company Ltd. (AOC) to carry out Northern Rhodesia’s first aerial photographic survey (1927-243 
1929). This endeavour alone was an enormous investment. There was no air infrastructure in 244 
the colony: few planes had ever flown over it, and only a handful of aircraft existed in Southern 245 
Africa (Blake, 1971).  The planes arrived in pieces from England on a steamer, then travelled by 246 
rail and finally motorcar to the RCBC concession (Anon., 1927).  With the planes came eight 247 
Europeans who occupied an extensive base-camp with several technical workshops, for over a 248 
year (McAdam, 1974). It had seemed that the new, two-engine planes would be most 249 
appropriate for flying long distances over the flat, bushy terrain, as they would mitigate the risk 250 
of engine failure and forced landing (Anon., 1928). However, the RCBC would not wait the 251 
several months these planes would take to commission and build. Instead they decided to use 252 
single-engine planes, and cut emergency landing grounds right across the concession at twenty-253 
mile intervals (Anon., 1928).  254 
The RCBC’s decision to commission aerial photography was not without risk.  In 1927 this 255 
technology was at an experimental stage. It had been employed for reconnaissance and 256 
mapping during the First World War, and in the 1920s was being tested within industrial 257 
projects. This had seen most success in Canada where it was supported by a nexus of 258 
governmental, military and industrial partners (Cronin, 2007; Dyce, 2013; Matthes, 1926). In the 259 
UK of the interwar period, however, there was little government support for aerial photography 260 
for either military or civil purposes (Collier, 2002), and its use was principally developed by 261 
small commercial interests. These companies had accomplished a handful of projects including 262 
timber surveys, route reconnaissance, and prospecting for oil, in Burma, Borneo and South 263 
                                                        
11 This is almost incomparable to government cartographic activity. The Survey Department’s 
expenditure for the whole year in 1927 was only £5,812 on salaries, and £142 on instruments) (Annual 
Report, Survey Department of Northern Rhodesia, 1927. NA UK CO799/3, page 490). 
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America (Anon., 1926, 1930), and it was far from guaranteed that the technique would be 264 
successful for copper prospecting in Central African conditions. 265 
So why was the RCBC prepared to risk bringing the AOC to Northern Rhodesia? There are two 266 
reasons, both important in understanding the mechanisms of the cartographic economy. First 267 
of these was timing. The RCBC had been granted exclusive prospecting rights, but only for a 268 
five-year period. They were also committed to particular levels of spending in ‘developing’ their 269 
concession. The Northern Rhodesian authorities included these clauses in their contract in 270 
response to prospecting practices of earlier years, which had tended to be badly funded and 271 
had resulted in disparate claims without strong evidence that would support their exploitation 272 
(Slinn, 1971). So whilst, according to Stone, the Northern Rhodesian government were possibly 273 
experiencing a lack of temporal incentive to mapping the colony (1995), the RCBC were under 274 
pressure to realise a profitable future. It was for this reason that the RCBC could not wait for 275 
double-engine aeroplanes to be constructed, and it accounts for their investment not just in 276 
aerial survey, but in several experimental methods that it was hoped would increase the 277 
rapidity and accuracy of their geological investigations (Bancroft and Guernsey, 1961). 278 
These time pressures increased the value of visualisations of the concession, but the mining 279 
companies had a second reason to be willing to take the risk: profit was being drawn from the 280 
enterprise at multiple points. Ostensibly, mining engineers were reducing the risk of mining 281 
investment by creating sounder, more reliable knowledge about potential ore-bodies and their 282 
extractability. However, these engineer-financiers were generating revenue for themselves in 283 
the process of assessing that potential; income they could still enjoy regardless of whether 284 
valuable minerals were discovered (Phimister and Mouat, 2003). The value of knowledge about 285 
the concession was being produced separately from the value of the concession itself. In fact 286 
aerial photography failed as a method of prospecting for copper under these conditions, but the 287 
result of the mining companies’ ability and motivation to take risks in the process of visualising 288 
Northern Rhodesian territory was that, after years of disparate activity by the Survey 289 
Department, large stretches of the colony were available to the distanciated gaze.  290 
Although the colonial government would never have initiated such expenditure, they were 291 
keen to take advantage of the resultant photography. The RCBC was satisfied with the 292 
photographs alone, and the Survey Department didn’t have the manpower or expertise to turn 293 
the photography into maps, so they solicited the imperial government for extraordinary funds 294 
to commission the AOC itself to produce topography. The Colonial Office agreed to provide the 295 
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£6,000 from the recently erected East Africa Loan Scheme to fund the private production of 296 
topographic maps of Block A (Figure 1) (Annual Report, Survey Department of Northern 297 
Rhodesia, 1927. NA UK CO799/3). 298 
A high-capital cartographic technology had arrived in Northern Rhodesia because the 299 
government had imposed time limits on the investigation of the concessions; now the time 300 
pressures were returned onto them. The AOC were keen to do as much business as possible 301 
before they left the region. The company campaigned vigorously in 1927 and 1928 for more 302 
photographic commissions (McAdam, 1974). Using the classic pitch (key to double-glazing sales) 303 
that the costs would be lower whilst they were in the neighbourhood, the AOC provided 304 
motivation for organisations to find partners who would share the costs of further projects. 305 
Between 1927 and 1931 this included four ‘extensions’ to the RCBC aerial photography, 306 
commissioned by the Northern Rhodesian government; most of which was funded by loans 307 
authorised by the Colonial Office, but partly by other private interests. These extensions 308 
resulted in further topography. The first photographic extension (source for the map sheets of 309 
Block B on Figure 1) extended the coverage of the Copperbelt. The second (map sheets in Block 310 
C) was subsidised by Robert Williams Co. Ltd., who wished to incorporate the transportation 311 
potential of the Upper Zambezi into their rail network. The third (map sheets in Block D) – 312 
which we will discuss in the next section  – documented the profitable farmland along the line 313 
of rail. Finally the Northern Rhodesian government also commissioned air photography of six 314 
townships (lying within these other areas) (Pullan, 1976).  315 
By 1929 one-fifth of the territory was photographed (Annual Report, Survey Department of 316 
Northern Rhodesia, 1929, 435, CO799/5, NA UK), yet the regular cycle “of indifference” and post 317 
hoc practice, had not been broken. Each of these projects were financed by extraordinary funds, 318 
and each diversified the participants in the Northern Rhodesian cartographic economy. The 319 
Northern Rhodesian government had temporary access to aerial photography as a cartographic 320 
technology. This solution would have been unavailable without sources of more fluid finances 321 
being made available. Without the exceptional financing for aerial photography, the annual 322 
records of topographic work of the years 1928-1935 would have most likely resembled the sparse 323 
lines shown in Figure 3. 324 
By detailing the influence of investment, risk and time pressure on the value of Northern 325 
Rhodesian topography in Block A we begin to see what levels of complexity are disguised by 326 
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idea that topographic maps cohere to  ‘one map of one territory’. We have seen that the value of 327 
topographic mapping was affected by government policy on concessions, the financial 328 
structure of the mining industry, and the interests of the AOC. The following section, which 329 
recounts the history of the production of the topographic maps in Block D (Fig. 1), reveals more 330 
about the role of different parties in actively manipulating the conceptual frameworks for the 331 
‘rational’ assessment of colonial resources.  332 
1 . 5  E c o l o g y ,  e c o n o m y :  t h e  r h e t o r i c s  a n d  r e a l i t y  o f  c o l o n i a l  333 
r e s o u r c e  m a n a g e m e n t   334 
Examining the history of the third section of topography Block D allows us several further 335 
insights into the cartographic economy. Firstly, it unravels the separate interests of a 336 
triumvirate of colonial presences in Northern Rhodesia; the colonial scientific officers, the 337 
colonial secretariat and the AOC. Secondly, it allows us to see the role of the AOC at work in 338 
shaping the value of ‘inscribed’ territory for both the scientists and secretariat of Northern 339 
Rhodesia.  340 
Recent histories that have treated aerial photography in Northern Rhodesia have variously 341 
conflated these groups. The AOC usually features as a tool¾innovative and clever, but 342 
fundamentally inert¾that state scientific experts worked to their own ends. The scientific 343 
experts, on the other hand, are credited with using both the content of the images and the 344 
techno-rhetoric of aerial photography to promote their interest in environmental systems and 345 
relations. This confusion can be seen in how the work of Ray Bourne is narrated. Bourne was 346 
an envoy of the Imperial Forestry Institute, sent by the Colonial Office to Northern Rhodesia in 347 
1928 to investigate the timber potential of the expansive forests in the colony. Peter Adey 348 
describes him as driving the use of aerial photography in Northern Rhodesia for forestry, a 349 
means for the Northern Rhodesian government to open the territory up “to the distanciated 350 
gaze for the imposition and projection of power and reach” (2010, page 86). In Helen Tilley’s 351 
Living Laboratories, Ray Bourne “seized the opportunity of demonstrating the value of 352 
employing aerial survey” (2011, page 144). Elsewhere in Imperial Ecology, Peter Anker linked 353 
Bourne’s presence to the goal of establishing clear political boundaries (2001, page 83). 354 
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Although Bourne was enthusiastic about aerial photography, in his own words it ‘happened’ 355 
that the AOC was in the field carrying out the project for the RCBC (1928, page 8). Yet he has 356 
consistently been seen to epitomise the proactive state inscription of natural resources and 357 
territory. We can see from the previous section that these narratives displace both the primacy 358 
of the copper industry in bringing the AOC to Northern Rhodesia, and the energetic 359 
propagation of aerial photography by the AOC themselves. Those authors have also mis-360 
assigned the agency of colonial scientists within government. The history of the mapping from 361 
air photography in Block D gives us insight into the failure of the rhetoric of rational resource 362 
management to vanquish short-term tactical attitudes to resource exploitation.  363 
The aerial photography behind the maps of Block D resulted from work carried out for the 364 
Agricultural Survey Commission in 1929 (Pullan, 1976). The purpose of the Commission was to 365 
consider how the farmland along side the line of rail should be distributed to settler farmers 366 
(Memorandum, Chief Agriculturalist, Northern Rhodesia, April 1932. National Archives of 367 
Zambia MAG2/9/5).12 This allocation had, (somewhat like the early prospecting) been 368 
proceeding in a relatively ad hoc manner. The outcome, it was suggested in 1926, was 369 
detrimental both to agricultural production and to colonial societal fabric (Annual Report, 370 
Survey Department of Northern Rhodesia, 1926. NA UK CO799/2). As the mining industry grew 371 
rapidly at the end of the decade, this problem gained a further intensity; food supplies needed 372 
to be secured for the miners (Governor of Northern Rhodesia to the Colonial Office, April 4th 373 
1929. NAZ MAG2/7/3). The Commission was keen to discover “the best manner in which [the 374 
land] should be divided into farms of economic acreage,” (Chief Secretary, Northern Rhodesia, 375 
to the Deputy Commissioner, Trade and Information Office of Great Britain, 29th September, 376 
1930. NAZ MAG/2/9/1), primarily in relation to transport and hydrography. A strip of aerial 377 
photography that ran 15 miles each side of the railway was provided by the AOC to assist them 378 
in this task.  379 
In 1931, a second set of aerial photographs of railway-belt land was produced. This was not a 380 
commissioned project, but an initiative of the AOC themselves. The air and groundwork were 381 
carried out single-handedly by Captain Charles Robbins, an employee of the AOC (An 382 
Experiment in the Classification of Land with the Use of Aerial Photographs. C. R. Robbins, 1932. NAZ 383 
MAG2/9/3). The project was intended to extend the market for the AOC’s work by proving the 384 
                                                        
12 National Archives of Zambia hereafter ‘NAZ’. 
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potential of aerial photography for the classification of soil types. It was recorded that Robbins 385 
felt that, “the local authorities, particularly the Agricultural Survey Commission were not 386 
making full use of the air photographs available” (R. Bourne to the Under Secretary of State for 387 
the Colonies, 14th August, 1933. NAZ MAG2/9/5). As a result Robbins was, “determined to show 388 
the possibilities of such a method conducted exclusively by his company”, which was described 389 
as, “a freak performance for demonstration purposes, and, as such the most remarkable one-390 
man effort I have ever studied” (Memorandum, Chief Agriculturalist, 1932. NAZ MAG2/9/1). The 391 
illusion that this was innovative government science, rather than a theatrical sales endeavour, 392 
was deliberately fostered by the AOC. They astutely called the project an “experimental aerial 393 
ecological survey” (An Experiment in the Classification of Land with the Use of Aerial Photographs. C. 394 
R. Robbins, 1932. NAZ MAG2/9/3). Robbins’ account of the project published in the Journal of 395 
Ecology follows a strategy that the AOC used elsewhere in their publicity: framing experimental 396 
projects as a successful response to pre-existing government demand (Cochran-Patrick, 1931; 397 
Robbins, 1934).  Thus, Peter Anker and Helen Tilley have read the ‘ecological’ in bolder terms 398 
than is perhaps just, when they set the use of air survey within the narrative of the growth of 399 
ecological attitudes within colonial science (Anker, 2001; Tilley, 2011).  400 
Robbins’ exercise shows that the AOC were keen to extend their services to the interpretative 401 
aspect of aerial photography, but the company were following this ambition through in a 402 
number of ways. They were also increasing in-house expertise, and building a network of 403 
contacts within the fields of forestry, geology and “general economic development” (Anon., 404 
1929b, page 1343). The interdisciplinarity of the AOC’s product was more usually promoted as 405 
an ‘economic survey’ than an ecological one (Anon., 1929a, 1929b; Crosthwait, 1930). Their 406 
eagerness to promote their services via the organs of scientific societies, was matched or 407 
exceeded by their activity in responding to debates about the role of colonial resources in 408 
solving British unemployment questions. According to the AOC, aerial photography could 409 
increase understanding of those resources, decrease the risk to those considering emigration, 410 
and decrease the cost of trade through a better siting of production and transport 411 
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infrastructures (Anon., 1929a, 1929b; Crosthwait, 1930). For example, in 1930, in response to an 412 
imperial report on the scale and structure of the political units of East Africa, Herbert 413 
Crosthwait, Director of the AOC prepared a paper for the Royal African Society, expounding 414 
the value of an “economic survey, for which maps are necessary”, and without which potential 415 
projects would founder in “imperfect and ill-digested information” (1930, pages 333–334). 416 
‘Economic survey’ was a term that could be applied to just about any of the work that the AOC 417 
were commissioned to do, and was generally used to emphasise the reconnaissance aspect of 418 
the air photography over that of providing detailed or precise measurements. Most 419 
importantly, it was more flexible term than the ‘ecological’ survey. It could cede non-420 
problematically to less rigorous epistemological principles. 421 
The topographic outcome between 1928 and 1955 (Figure 1) suggests that the patterns of the 422 
ecologists’ interests, and priorities had little influence on Northern Rhodesian policy more 423 
broadly. ‘Economic’ rather than ‘ecological’ thinking won the day. The government scientists in 424 
Northern Rhodesia built most of their knowledge from decades of traverses by foot and 425 
automobile (Wigg, 1949). Elsewhere in the colony, when scientific officers attempted 426 
investigations, they didn’t have even provisional base maps and had to sketch their own ad hoc 427 
substitutes (Summary of Work: Mankoya and Lealui Districts. Forestry Officer for Barotseland, J. 428 
Martin, 1939. NAZ SEC1/975).  It was the skill of the AOC to be able to marry the contradictory 429 
positions represented by the rhetoric of holistic decision-making frameworks and scientific 430 
planning, and the reality of government interest in visualising isolated, profitable areas. The 431 
‘economic survey’ of the AOC, was (in the words of Captain Robbins) in fact offering the 432 
possibility to, “Eliminat[e]… those areas which… were of lesser economic interest… [confining the] 433 
labours of expert investigation to those areas more likely to yield profitable results [so that each 434 
would receive] attention in direct proportion to its importance” (emphasis added) (An 435 
Experiment in the Classification of Land with the Use of Aerial Photographs. C. R. Robbins, 1932. NAZ 436 
MAG2/9/3).   437 
The original model of a neoliberal governmental regime describes state observation techniques 438 
being deployed for the purpose of deciding the appropriate level of state intervention (Foucault, 439 
2009; Osborne, 1996). However, it is hard to see how the Northern Rhodesian attitude towards 440 
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topography might reflect these goals for data collection. The ‘importance’ of an area of territory 441 
was almost always determined in advance, and under fairly aleatory circumstances. This is 442 
perhaps not surprising, it could in fact be expected that twentieth century cartography might 443 
compound rather than alleviate ‘uneven development’. However, in the case of Northern 444 
Rhodesia, insufficient analysis of the difference between the values of the ‘ecological’ and 445 
‘economic’ surveys; and the failure of existing studies to identify the influence of commercial 446 
interests in shaping cartographic production have obscured this perspective. As a result the 447 
rhetoric of the importance of holistic territorial visualisation to rational resource management 448 
has been taken somewhat too seriously. In considering colonial cartography more broadly, that 449 
rhetoric should be treated with caution. 450 
1 . 6  C o n c l u s i o n  451 
These histories of the uptake of aerial photography and the progress of colonial mapping are 452 
particular to Northern Rhodesia, but the model of a cartographic economy has viability 453 
elsewhere. Although the high-capital nature of aerial photography highlights questions of 454 
investment and value, all forms of territorial visualisation (including traditional land-based 455 
survey) are based on anticipated returns. As Edgar Barton Worthington suggested in his 1938 456 
review, Science in Africa, “Survey work, like other branches of development, should be financed 457 
by pledging the future” (1938, page 35). The intermittent reviews of African cartography from 458 
throughout the twentieth-century suggest the variety of commitments that were ‘pledged’ in 459 
the production of topography. The imperial policy of assigning responsibility for ‘routine 460 
mapping’ to local colonial survey offices means that the history of each of these will be 461 
somewhat different. Each territory saw shifting rates of colonial interest and capital investment 462 
(whether through settlers, plantation farming or mineral extraction). Patterns in mapping 463 
reflect the prevailing institutional and technological cartographic capacities at peak moments 464 
of interest. 465 
If we don't take the value of topographic mapping to be self-evident, or its action to necessarily 466 
be ‘homogenising’ then we can begin to find more complex causal explanations for the patterns 467 
that can be observed in the case of early twentieth-century Northern Rhodesia. The model of a 468 
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cartographic economy has delivered four conclusions that are occluded by earlier studies. First 469 
of these is that the short period between 1927 and 1931 represents a transient moment during 470 
which topographic mapping was produced as the result of temporary circumstances that united 471 
different groups with divergent interests. Second is that the influences on the production of 472 
topography in Northern Rhodesia were relatively decentralised. Third, the value of 473 
governmental topography was not fixed, but could be ‘produced’ through various mechanisms 474 
– including the imposition of timeframes on resource exploitation, or the availability of 475 
technologies. Those timeframes could be manipulated in favour of those who profited from 476 
mapping projects. Finally, focusing on governmental scientific offices (including cartographic 477 
ones) might tend to discover an ambition to produce complete and homogeneous territorial 478 
representations. Yet what we have learned from more rounded histories of colonial agricultural 479 
science or anthropology applies equally to colonial knowledge of territory: ambitions were not 480 
necessarily shared across governmental authorities. Colonial epistemological positions were 481 
operated within tactically, by variety of parties. 482 
Cartographic heterogeneity was more than an incidental effect of colonial rule. We need finer 483 
vocabularies to describe how cartography might serve to enable and to regulate social activity, 484 
and to differentiate between its usage within various forms of governmental and profit-making 485 
regimes. This would allow us a better grasp on the role of mapping in the evolving spatialities 486 
of post-independence Zambia, and beyond. 487 
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